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ON  FISCAL  RESPONSIBILITY* 
James  Parthemos 
I gather  that  the  general  theme  of your  proceedings 
this  year  is  a  thing  called  “fiscal  responsibility”  and 
that  I’m  expected  to  say  something  about  what  con- 
stitutes  “fiscally  responsible”  behavior  on  the  part  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System.  This  is a subject  which 
I  can  tackle  with  some  relish,  since  I  have  some 
pretty  strong  convictions  about  it. 
As  a beginner,  let  me  try  to  pin  down  a  fairly  pre- 
cise  definition  of  the  term  “fiscal  responsibility.” 
This  is necessary,  I  think,  because  the  term  tends  to 
be  interpreted  in  different  ways  by  different  groups, 
depending  not  only  on  the  context  but  also  on  the 
prejudices  of the  interpreter.  As  accountants  you  are 
concerned  chiefly  with  fiscal  responsibility  at  the 
individual  firm  or  program  level.  The  term  carries 
an  important  dollars-and-cents  connotation  for  you 
and  you  are,  by  training,  highly  sensitive  to  the 
unhappy  results  of  lapses  from  this  kind  of  respon- 
sibility.  That  attitude  would  serve  us  well  if  it  could 
be  extended  into  the  public  policy  area,  and  some- 
times  I  think  it  might  be  a good  idea  if  some  training 
in  accounting  were  required  of  all  office  holders  in 
this  country. 
It’s  in  the  area  of  public  policy,  unfortunately,  that 
we  have  different  and,  too  frequently,  conflicting 
notions  of  what  constitutes  fiscal  responsibility.  And 
these  differences  are  not  confined  to  the  politicians. 
They  apply  as  well  to  the  large  group  of  professional 
economists  who  concern  themselves  with  public 
policy  issues.  It’s  clear,  I  think,  that  “fiscal  respon- 
sibility”  would  mean  one  thing  to  Milton  Friedman 
and  quite  another  to  John  Kenneth  Galbraith;  one 
thing  to  George  McGovern  and  quite  another  to,  say, 
Strom  Thurmond.  At  one  end  of  some  ideological 
spectrum  the  term  connotes  tight  government  bud- 
gets,  without  deficits,  and  with  a  restrictive  view  of 
the  appropriate  functions  of  government.  At  the 
other,  it  usually  reflects  a  view  that  fears  of  high 
levels  of  government  spending  and  government  defi- 
cits  should  not  be  allowed  to  impede  government 
efforts  to  solve  a  broad  range  of  social  and  economic 
problems  so  long  as  the  deficits  do  not  exceed  a rela- 
tively  small  fraction  of  GNP.  The  basic  difference 
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here,  it  should  be  noted,  is  one  regarding  the  appro- 
priate  role  of government  and,  in effect,  pits  a dollars- 
and-cents  notion  of  fiscal  responsibility  in  govern- 
ment  against  some  loosely  defined  notion  of  social 
responsibility  of government  that  transcends  dollars- 
and-cents  considerations. 
But  these  are  the  extremes  and  serve  mainly  to 
point  up  my  rather  strong  impression  that  the  term 
“fiscal  responsibility”  has  tended  to  become  a  politi- 
cal buzz  word  with  relatively  little  substantive  mean- 
ing.  It  is  tossed  around  by  both  so-called  conserva- 
tives  and  so-called  liberals,  both  left  wing  Democrats 
and  right  wing  Republicans,  with  all  sides  using 
it  as  a  sort  of  shibboleth  to  support  their  respective 
positions  and  to  cajole  their  respective  constituents. 
We  all  like  to  think  we  are  “fiscally  responsible,” 
much  as  we  like  to  think  we  are  morally  upright. 
And  we’re  all  tempted  to  think  that  those  who  dis- 
agree  with  us  are  “fiscally  irresponsible”  just  as 
we’re  tempted  to  believe  that  those  who  don’t  share 
our  moral  values  may  be  of  dubious  morality. 
To  avoid  difficulties  that  we  get  into  by  using 
terms  so  loosely,  I’d  like  to  offer  you  a  more  specific 
definition  of fiscal  responsibility  in  public  policy,  one 
that  we  can  establish  a concrete  criterion  for  judging. 
To  do  this,  it  might  be  useful  to  make  a  distinction 
between  government  policy  at  the  Federal  level  and 
that  at  the  level  of  state  and  local  government.  This 
distinction  is  important,  I  think,  not  only  because 
Federal  policies  are  more  pervasive  in  their  immedi- 
ate  effects  but  also  because  Federal  policies  can  have 
important  direct  and  indirect  credit  and  monetary 
effects  that  are  not  present  in  state  and  local  govern- 
ment  policies. 
In  any  case,  let  me  focus  for  the  moment  on  policy 
at  the  Federal  level.  Here  my  criterion  for  judging 
the  fiscal  responsibility  or  irresponsibility  of  govern- 
ment  policies  would  be  their  effects  on  the  value  and 
the  integrity  of  the  dollar,  in  both  its  domestic  and 
its  international  uses.  Policies  that  take  account  of 
the  broad  social  advantages  of  maintaining  a  stable 
value  of  our  currency  are,  in  my  view,  fiscally  sound. 
Those  that  assign  little  or  no  value  to  the  stability 
and  integrity  of  our  money  I  would  have  to  call 
fiscally  irresponsible.  What  I’m  saying  here  is  that 
policies  that  promote  inflation,  or  even  countenance 
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they  are  bound to  eventuate  in  hardship  for  sub- 
stantial  groups in  our  society  or  for  virtually  all 
groups.  At  worst  they  can  undermine  the  bases  not 
only  of our  economic  system  but  the  foundations  of 
our  political  and  social  institutions,  including  our 
position  of  political  and  economic  leadership  in  the 
free  world.  But,  to  emphasize  here,  the  important 
point  is  the  crucial  significance  of  the  value  and  the 
integrity  of  the  dollar  as  the  criterion  for  judging 
fiscal  responsibility. 
The  remainder  of  my  remarks  will  be  devoted 
primarily  to  fiscal  responsibility  at  the  level  of  Fed- 
eral  government  policies  which,  I  believe,  is the  area 
that  you’re  interested  in.  In  any  case,  it’s  only  at  the 
Federal  level  that  the  Federal  Reserve  System  can 
play  any  role  in  promoting  fiscal  responsibility.  But 
I  don’t  mean to  suggest  here  that  the  term  “fiscal 
responsibility  or  irresponsibility”  has  no  meaning  at 
the  state  and  local  government  level.  State  and  local 
governments  have  been  known  to  persist  in  policies 
and  fiscal  practices  that  quite  justifiably  deserve  to 
be characterized  as irresponsible.  We  have  a number 
of  contemporaneous  cases  in  point.  But  the  payoff 
for  fiscal  irresponsibility  at  these  levels-in  economic 
or  political  or  social  terms-is  neither  as  extensive 
nor  as  dire  as  that  resulting  from  fiscal  irresponsi- 
bility  at  the  Federal  level.  Also,  since  irresponsible 
fiscal  behavior  at  the  state  and  local  level  has  no  sig- 
nificance  for  the  stability  and  integrity  of our  money, 
the  criterion  for  specifying  it  must  be  different  from 
the  specifications  at  the  Federal  level.  At  the  state 
and  local  level  the  criterion  must  be  related  to  the 
sustainability  of  the  debt  encumbrance  imposed  on 
taxpayers.  Clearly  the  indebtedness  of  a  state  or  a 
locality  can  assume  dimensions  that  impose  undue 
hardships  and  perhaps  also  retard  economic  develop- 
ment  through  excessive  taxes  or  through  defaults 
that  render  capital  expansion  excessively  costly  or 
even  impossible. 
Budgetary  Policy  and  the  Value  of  Money  With 
these  background  remarks  out  of  the  way,  let  me 
return  now  to  the  theme  of  fiscal  responsibility  in 
public  policies  at  the  Federal  level.  And  at  this  point 
I’d  like  to  say a  few  words  about  deficits  in  the 
Federal  budget,  which  many  people  seem  to  equate 
with  fiscal  irresponsibility.  You  will  note  first  that  a 
Federal  deficit  does  not  necessarily  represent  fiscal 
irresponsibility  according  to  my  definition  of  that 
term.  Let me  emphasize  the  word  necessarily.  It  is 
possible  for  a deficit  to  be financed  in such  a way  that 
it  does  not  prejudice  the  integrity  or  the  stability 
of the  dollar.  As  a matter  of fact,  sometimes  a deficit 
may  be  quite  responsible  from  the  public  policy 
standpoint,  although  my  own  conviction  is that  these 
times  are  fewer  and  further  between  than  a  good 
many  of  my  professional  acquaintances  believe.  In 
any  case,  it’s clear  to  me  that  a deficit  can  be financed 
without  any  significant  effects  on the  supply  of  money 
or  on  its  value  at  home  or  abroad.  All  that  the  gov- 
ernment  has  to  do  is  to  go  out  into  the  market  for 
loan  funds  and  borrow  the  necessary  money,  paying 
the  market  price,  out  of  the  money  that’s  already  in 
existence.  It’s  only  when  the  government  undertakes 
to  finance  the  deficit  out  of  newly  created  money  that 
the  value  and  the  integrity  of  the  dollar  is likely  to  be 
affected.  If  the  deficits  are  large  and  sustained  over 
long  periods,  the  temptation  to  finance  them  with 
newly  created  money  becomes  politically  irresistible. 
The  reason  for  this  is that  the  resulting  large  govern- 
ment  demands  on  our  money  markets  would  drive 
interest  rates  up  to  excessive  levels  and  make  credit 
inordinately  expensive  for  private  borrowers,  both 
businesses  and  households,  and  for  state  and  local 
governments.  To  finesse  the  public  hue  and  cry  that 
would  result,  the  government  is highly  likely  to  take 
what  it  views  as  the  easy  way  out  and  to  follow  a 
course  that  results  in  the  creation  of  a  large  amount 
of  new  money. 
But  it  usually  turns  out  that  this  is  really  not  the 
easy  way  out.  It  is only  a  temporary  expedient  and, 
in effect,  simply  a means  of  postponing  for  a time  the 
problem  of  rising  interest  rates.  As  the  new  money 
works  its  way  through  the  economy,  prices  start 
rising;  that  is,  inflation  sets  in.  And  as  inflation 
gathers  steam,  two  things  follow  that  inevitably  push 
interest  rates  up.  First,  higher  prices  produce  an 
increase  in  credit  demands  on  the  part  of  businesses, 
households,  and  state  and  local  governments.  That 
is  easy  to  see  if  you  consider  what  happens  to  the 
demand  for  mortgage  credit  when  houses  that  have 
been  selling  for  $35,000  go  up  to  say  $45,000.  The 
buyer  now  has  to  borrow  $10,000  more  than  was 
necessary  before  the  price  increase.  This  has  general 
application  not  only  to  home  buyers  but  also  to 
consumers  in  general,  to  businesses,  and  to  govern- 
ments,  all  of  whom  finance  a  considerable  part  of 
their  current  purchases  with  borrowed  money.  The 
second  thing  that  happens  is  that  suppliers  of  credit 
become  more  reluctant  to  lend  their  money  at  current 
interest  rates.  This  is because  the  rising  prices  mean 
a  steady  cheapening  of  the  dollar  and  lenders  know 
that  they  will  be  repaid  in  dollars  that  are  less  valu- 
able  in  real  terms  than  the  dollars  they  lend.  Hence 
they  will  demand  a  premium  on  their  money  suffi- 
cient  to  compensate  for  this  cheapening  of  the  dollar. 
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luctant  to  lend  unless  they  can  get  a  higher  return, 
interest  rates  quite  naturally  rise.  You  can  fight  this 
rise  for  a  time  by  creating  more  and  more  new 
money,  but  this  becomes  like  the  proverbial  dog 
chasing  its  tail.  More  analogously,  it’s  like  putting 
yourself  on  something  like  “speed”  because  the  more 
new  money  you  create,  the  greater  the  necessity  for 
creating  even  more. 
International  Complications  Over  the  past  dozen 
or  more  years,  with  the  increasing  financial  inte- 
gration  of  the  world’s  major  economies,  inflation  has 
tended  to  spawn  a  new  and  serious  financial  compli- 
cation.  The  cheapening  of  the  dollar  at  home  has a 
counterpart  in  the  international  exchanges,  where  the 
dollar  is traded  against  foreign  currencies.  We’re  in 
a  situation  now  where  a  cheapening  of  the  dollar  at 
home  almost  inevitably  leads  to  a  cheapening  of  the 
dollar  abroad.  I  say  “almost”  because  whether  or 
not  the  dollar  declines  in  value  against  other  curren- 
cies  of  the  world  depends  on  whether  inflation  over 
here  is proceeding  at  a  pace  more  rapid  than  that  in 
other  major  countries.  If  all  the  countries  of  the 
world  were  equally  irresponsible  fiscally,  value  rela- 
tionships  among  the  world’s  currencies  would  be 
unaffected.  But  if  we  are  more  fiscally  irresponsible 
than  other  countries,  then  you  can  expect  the  value 
of  the  dollar  in  terms  of  other  countries  to  decline. 
This  is,  in  fact,  what  has  been  happening  over  the 
past  18 months,  and  that  should  tell  us  something. 
Any  sustained  decline  in  the  foreign  value  of  the 
dollar  can  have  serious  implications  not  only  for  the 
U.  S.  economy  but  also  for  the  economies  of  the 
other  major  countries  of  the  world.  Large  amounts 
of  dollars  are  held  by  foreign  monetary  authorities 
as  reserves,  by  central  banks  and  foreign  banks,  by 
multinational  firms  domiciled  both  here  and  abroad, 
and  by  wealthy  individuals.  A  decline  in  the  value 
of  the  dollar  means  a  reduction  in  the  real  wealth 
of  these  major  holders  of  dollars  and  this,  of  course, 
will  have  an  impact  on  the  economic  behavior  of these 
groups.  It  could,  for  example,  lead  to  a  reduction 
in their  spending,  which  would  mean  a corresponding 
reduction  in  the  level  of  world  trade  and  investment 
and  hence  in economic  activity  throughout  the  trading 
world.  Apart  from  this,  any  depreciation  of  the 
dollar  is matched  by  an  increase  in  the  value  of  other 
key  foreign  currencies  and  this  raises  the  dollar 
prices  of  foreign  goods.  This  has  important  impli- 
cations  both  for  our  economy  and  foreign  economies. 
Since  it  raises  the  prices  of  our  imports  it  aggravates 
our  own  rate  of  inflation. At  the  same  time  it  tends 
to  reduce  the  worldwide  demand  for  the  goods  of 
other  important  countries,  like  Germany  and  Japan, 
and  makes  problems  for  them.  This  kind  of situation 
promotes  political  attitudes  that  make  for  a  prolifer- 
ation  of  trade  barriers  among  the  trading  nations  of 
the  world  and  this  too  tends  to  reduce  the  volume  of 
world  trade  to  the  detriment  of all countries.  It  is for 
reasons  like  this  that  we  cannot  reasonably  expect  to 
maintain  a  position  of  economic  and  political  leader- 
ship  in  the  world  in  the  face  of  a  sustained  and  pro- 
gressive  decline  in  the  value  of  the  dollar. 
Role  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Now  I’ve  gotten 
this  far  and  I’ve  yet  to  say  anything  at  all  about 
where  the  Federal  Reserve  System  fits  into  this 
picture.  The  Federal  Reserve,  you  must  know,  is 
our  central  bank.  It  has  the  power  and  the  authority 
to  create  and  destroy  money.  More  correctly,  it  has 
the  power  and  authority  to  vary  the  rate  at  which 
new  money  is  being  created  at  any  given  time.  It 
should  follow  from  this  that  if  too  much  new  money 
is being  created  and  inflation  is resulting  the  Federal 
Reserve  is, somehow,  to  blame-or,  at  least,  that  it is 
implicated  in  the  crime.  And,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
there  are  people,  some  of  them  highly  respected  pro- 
fessional  experts,  who  lay  the  blame  directly  at  our 
door. 
Now  I’m  not  here  to  apologize  for  the  Federal 
Reserve  on  this  particular  score.  But  I  think  we 
ought  to  be  careful  to  give  the  Fed  a  fair  trial.  And 
to  do  this  it’s  first  necessary  to  appreciate  some 
unique  features  of  our  central  banking  arrangements. 
The  Federal  Reserve  differs  in  some  important  re- 
spects  from  other  central  banks  that  have  the  power 
to  control  money  and  credit.  For  the  most  part,  the 
difference  grows  out  of  the  greater  degree  of  political 
democracy  that  exists  in  this  country  compared  with 
the  other  major  countries  of  the  world.  This  can  be 
seen,  I  think,  when  we  consider  the  position  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  in  our  political  system. 
The  Constitution  of  the  U.  S.  vests  the  monetary 
authority  in  the  Congress  of  the  U.  S.,  i.e.,  in  the 
elected  representatives  of  the  people.  Monetary 
management,  of  course,  is  a  specialized  art  that  can 
hardly be  carried  out  by  a  body  of  535  representa- 
tives.  So,  through  experience  that  was  sometimes 
quite  painful,  Congress  early  in  this  century  decided 
to  delegate  the  task  of  monetary  management  to  a 
central  bank, i.e.,  to  the  Federal  Reserve.  But  it  has 
taken  pains  to  insure  that  the  Fed  be  accountable  to 
Congress  and  it  is  clear  that  our  money  cannot  be 
managed  without  regard  to  the  Congressional  will. 
What  I’m  saying  here,  of  course,  is  that  despite 
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Fed  is  in  fact  not  independent.  Or,  if  it  is  inde- 
pendent,  it  is  in  a  quite  unique  sense  of  that  term. 
We  are  certainly  not  independent  of  Congress.  If 
Congress  passed  a  law  requiring  us  to  inflate  the 
currency  at  a  10 percent  per  year  rate,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  we  would  do  otherwise.  Also  it  is not  at 
all  clear  that  we  are  entirely  independent  of  the 
executive  branch  of  government,  i.e.,  of  the  President 
and  the  Treasury.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act  and  its 
many  amendments  give  us  some  specific  duties  to 
perform  for  the  Administration  at  its  command  and 
at  its  pleasure.  So  whether  we  have  independent 
authority  to  manage  money  and  credit  on  the  basis 
of  our  own  judgment  and  in  disregard  of  Congress 
and  the  Administration  is  questionable  at  best. 
Now  this  brings  me  to  the  key  question  that  has  to 
be  answered  in evaluating  the  role  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  in  this  thing  that  we  call  “fiscal  responsibility” 
and  which  I  have’  linked  to  the  necessity  of  main- 
taining  the  stability  and  the  integrity  of  the  dollar. 
I  have  noted  that  large  and  persistent  deficits  in  the 
Federal  budget,  if  financed  through  the  creation  of 
new  money,  must  inevitably  lead  to  inflation  and  to  a 
cheapening  of  the  dollar  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
I  have  also  noted  that  the  Federal  Reserve,  as  our 
central  bank,  manages  the  actual  operations  through 
which  new  money  is  created.  Finally,  I  emphasized 
that  the  Fed  is  accountable  to  Congress  and  not 
altogether  independent  of  the  executive.  Now  the 
question  is  this:  In  the  face  of  large  and  persistent 
Federal  deficits  that  exert  strong  upward  pressures 
on  interest  rates,  how  should  the  Federal  Reserve 
react  ? 
Basically,  in  such  a situation,  there  are  two  courses 
of  action  open  to  the  Fed,  both  of which  involve  risks 
that  could  prove  serious  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
economy’s  behavior.  First,  we  could  ignore  the  defi- 
cits  and  let  the  resulting  pressures  on  interest  rates 
show  through  directly  and  immediately  in  our  money 
and  credit  markets.  This  would  make  money  and 
credit  significantly  more  expensive  for  private  bor- 
rowers  and  shift  resources  directly  from  the  private 
sector  to  the  public  sector.  Private  businesses  would 
be  hurt  and  the  level  of  activity  in  the  private  sector 
would  probably  suffer  since  less  capital  than  other- 
wise  would  be available  to  that  sector.  To  the  extent 
that  the  private  sector  makes  more  efficient  use  of 
resources  than  government  does,  the  overall  perform- 
ance  of  the  economy  would  suffer.  And  of  course 
with  the  rigidities  that  we  have  in  our  economy  and 
in our  financial  markets,  there’s  always  a good  chance 
that  a  strong  upward  movement  in  interest  rates 
could  do  serious  damage  to  a  key  sector  of  the 
economy,  like  construction,  and  through  such  an 
effect  precipitate  a  business  recession.  In  any  case, 
this  particular  course  of  action  would  not  be  accom- 
panied  by  any  significant  degree  of  inflation  and  may 
well  strengthen  rather  than  prejudice  the  value  of 
the  dollar  abroad. 
The  second  course  of  action  would  involve  resist- 
ing  the  interest rate  pressures  resulting  from  the 
deficits  by  creating  new  money.  If  the  deficits  were 
large  and  we  undertook  to  finance  them  entirely 
through  the  creation  of  new  money,  the  amount  of 
money  in  the  hands  of  the  spending  public  would 
grow  at  a  rapid  rate.  At  some  fairly  early  stage, 
depending  on  the  rate  of  resources  use  at  the  time 
the  deficits  begin,  prices  would  begin  to  rise.  As  I 
noted  earlier,  this  in  itself  would  produce  strong 
upward  pressures  on interest  rates,  which  would  rein- 
force  the  pressures  generated  by  continuing  deficits. 
So,  in  the  face  of  continuing  large  deficits,  efforts 
to  resist  rising  interest  rates  through  new  money 
creation  will  succeed  only  in feeding  inflation  without 
moderating  upward  pressures  on  interest  rates.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  interest  rates  would  probably  continue 
to  rise  as  the  inflation  progressed.  And,  as  I  noted, 
to  the  extent  that  our  inflation  outdistanced  that  in 
other  countries,  our  dollar  would  be  cheapened  in 
the  foreign  exchanges  and  this  too  would  exacerbate 
both  our  inflation  and  our  interest  rate  problems. 
So  it’s  clear  that  any  sustained  program  undertaken 
to  offset  the  interest  rate  effects  of  large,  persisting 
Federal  deficits  through  monetary  expansion  can 
lead  to  no  good  end.  It  will  inevitably  set  off  a train 
of economic  and  financial  developments  that  will  lead 
to  some  kind  of  economic  impasse,  a  business  slump 
at  best  or  a  major  financial  crisis  at  worst. 
The  moral  of  the  story  here  is that  large,  continu- 
ing  deficits  put  us on  the  horns  of  a  painful  dilemma. 
We  either  have  to  accept,  without  resistance,  a  sharp 
rise  in  interest  rates  that  shrinks  the  private  sector 
and  risks  a  business  recession.  Or,  alternatively,  we 
can  launch  a program  of  monetary  expansion  to  resist 
the  interest  rate  pressures,  knowing  that,  if  the  defi- 
cits  continue,  the  program  will  not  only  be  futile  but 
will  also  increase  the  risks  of  a  serious  recession. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  when  large  Federal 
deficits  persist  over  a  long  period,  as  they  have  over 
the  past  ten  years,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  no  good 
options. 
My  own  feeling  is  that  the  least  bad  option  is  to 
ignore  the  deficits  and  let  the  government,  like  every- 
one  else,  pay  the  going  market  price  for  the  funds  it 
needs  to  borrow-.  I  think  we  come  out  much  better 
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ing  money  and  credit  requirements  of  the  private 
sector,  without  regard  to  the  borrowing  needs  of  the 
government  except  in  periods  of  war  or  of  grave  na- 
tional  emergency.  But,  as  either  a  legal  or  as a prac- 
tical  matter,  it  is not  clear  that  we  have  the  authority 
to  follow  such  a  course.  The  law,  as  I  said  earlier, 
saddles  us  with  some  responsibilities  to  the  Treasury 
in  its  financing  operations.  Moreover,  Congressmen, 
sensitive  to  the  complaints  of  constituents  who  de- 
pend  on  borrowed  money,  don’t  like  to  see  interest 
rates  rise,  even  when  the  increases  are  the  inevitable 
outcome  of  budgetary  and  tax  legislation  that  they 
themselves  are  responsible  for.  So  in  the  kind  of 
situation  I  have  been  describing  all  the  pressures  on 
us  are  in  the  direction  of  resisting  the  rate  increases 
through  monetary  expansion. 
These  pressures  are,  of course,  of a political  nature. 
And  here,  I  think,  it’s  appropriate  to  raise  the  ques- 
tion  of  whether  the  Fed  should  or  should  not  knuckle 
under  to  these  pressures.  It’s  easy  to  say  that  we 
should  not  if,  in  our  judgment,  knuckling  under  is 
not  in  the  public  interest;  that  we  should  be  “coura- 
geous.”  Perhaps  we  should.  But  we  should  keep  in 
mind  the  point  I  made  about  the  so-called  “independ- 
ence”  of  the  Fed.  We  are  a creature  of, and  account- 
able  to,  Congress  as  a  Constitutional  matter.  Can 
we  really  afford  to  substitute  our  own  judgment  of 
the  public  interest  for  the  Congressional  will  which; 
after  all, is supposed  to  be,  in  our  form  of  democracy, 
a reflection  of  the  will  of  the  people?  Is  it  appropri- 
ate  for  us  to  do  so?  These  are  the  kinds  of  questions 
that  have  to  be  answered  in  assessing  the  Fed’s  role 
in  promoting  fiscal  responsibility  in  our  society. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  is  pleased  to  announce  two  new  publications. 
BUYING  TREASURY  SECURITIES  AT  FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANKS 
This  easy-to-read  booklet  outlines  the  step-by-step  procedure  whereby  individuals 
can  purchase  Treasury  securities  from  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  In  addition,  the 
booklet  describes  the  various  types  of  Treasury  securities-bills,  notes,  and  bonds 
-available  for  purchase. 
ESSAYS  ON  INFLATION 
This  volume  consists  of  16  articles  on  the  subject  of  inflation,  14  of  which 
originally  appeared  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond’s  Economic  Review. 
Collectively,  the  articles  summarize  the  major  issues  current  in  contemporary 
discussions  of  the  inflation  problem.  Topics  covered  include  theories  of  inflation, 
models  of  the  inflationary  transmission  mechanism,  the  relationship  between 
inflation  and  unemployment,  the  formulation  of  inflationary  expectations,  interest 
rates  and  inflation,  international  aspects  of  inflation,  and  alternative  anti-inflationary 
policy  prescriptions. 
These  publications  may  be  obtained  free  of  charge  by  writing  to  Bank  and  Public  Relations, 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  P.  O.  Box  27622,  Richmond,  Virginia  23261. 
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